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Abstract
We present a model of income tax avoidance with heterogenous agents, assuming the
presence of a comparison income eﬀect and of a psychic cost (disutility) of tax dodging.
We analyse the policy preferences of the agents, and identify a median-voter political equi-
librium. Paralleling previous results in the optimal taxation literature, we show that the
comparison income eﬀect calls for a high degree of progressivity of the income tax; addi-
tionally, we ﬁnd that this tendence is strenghtened by the psychic cost of avoidance. We
then investigate the source of the stigma attached to the act of avoidance and ﬁnd that
such stigma is motivated by the desire to make redistribution more eﬀective, and that it is
enhanced by the income comparison eﬀect.
II n t r o d u c t i o n
A problem that economists have traditionally encountered when studying imperfect tax com-
pliance is that, while the phenomenon is quantitatively relevant in all countries (no matter
whether they have developed, transition or developing economies), is not nearly as large as it
should be. If homo oeconomicus were an accurate portrait of the real-world economic agent,
then nobody should ever fully comply with the tax rules, as there are immediate and obvious
∗My deepest thanks to Cinzia Ciardi who suggested that I look into the social psychology literature and helped
me considerably with its interpretation. Also, thanks to Umberto Galmarini who suggested the proof in fn. 11.
The ﬁrst draft of this paper was written while I was visiting EPRU, University of Copenhagen, in September
2005; I am indebted to Peter Birch Sorensen and Soren Bo Nielsen for insightful discussions which motivated my
interest in the link between social norms and tax non-compliance.
1gains to be reaped against a small probability of being caught. In reality, while it is presumably
true that, given the chance, almost everybody will commit the occasional act of tax dodging,
only a minority takes this up as a systematic activity.1
There have been various attempts at solving this conundrum. An interesting insight is
oﬀered by works like those by Friedman et al. (2000) and Johnson et al. (1997, 1998), arguing
that tax dodging is closely related to tax implementation, regulation and corruption, and thus
that changes along these dimensions explain most of the variation in non-compliance. We will
follow however another branch of the literature, focusing on the existence of social norms against
tax dodging; see e.g. Gordon (1989), Myles and Naylor (1996) and Orviska and Hudson (2002).
If an individual believes that cheating the government is an intrinsically bad act, that is if she
has interiorised a social norm against such behaviour, she will abstain from it even if it is clearly
lucrative. Possibly, this line of enquiry goes, in some sense, deeper than the preceding one. It
is in fact likely that the presence in the society of a negative attitude towards tax dodging
will aﬀect both the way the tax system is administered and the way individual citizens relate
themselves to it. Where avoiding or evading taxes carries a social stigma there is less scope for
corruption among tax oﬃcers and the tax-payers are more prone to comply with the rules.
One thing which is usually overlooked in the literature on social customs and tax avoidance
is the question of how the norm is established. Why should rational, utility-maximising agents
create a norm which goes seemingly against their own interest? There is thus a missing link
in the analysis; one studies how the norm aﬀect individual behaviour, but does not ask how
individual behaviour contributes to establish the norm. This missing link will be addressed
in the present paper.2 In order to do this, we can rely on two important lines of research,
since both economists and social psychologists have investigated the spontaneous formation of
social norms. In economics, we have the pioneering work of Akerlof (1980) and more recent
examples, like Naylor (1990) or Lindbeck et al. (1999), in which social norms, whose importance
reﬂects (among other things) the number of agents that comply with them, are assumed to arise
endogenously. In social psychology, there are fundamental works showing that indeed groups
tend to create internal rules for behaviour using informal procedures (e.g. Sherif 1936; Hogg
1According to Schneider and Enste (2002) the average size of the shadow economy in the 90’s was in the range
of 12%, 23% and 39% of GDP for, respectively, developed, transition and developing economies.
2For a related attempt, see e.g. Feld and Frey (2005), where tax compliance is interpreted as the outcome of
a psychological contract.
2and Hardie 1992), and that conformity to the views of the majority is a powerful factor in
determining adherence to the norm (e.g. Asch 1955; Baron et al. 1996).3
The perspective we take here is that social norms do not exist in a vacuum, they must
perform some useful social task in order to ﬁrst arise and then survive. Speciﬁcally, we argue that
a social norm against tax dodging serves two purposes. The ﬁrst is straightforward: when the
norm is active, compliance rises, hence there will be less distortion associated with redistributive
taxation. In other words, the custom makes redistribution less costly and more eﬀective. The
second purpose is somewhat less self-evident: we suggest that another role of the norm is to
facilitate social competition. Where people feel a strong urge of bettering themselves, social
mobility is high, and the search for status compelling, norms are extremely important in that
they prevent competition from degenerating into a rat race; "not playing by the rules", for
example achieving status by cheating the government, cannot thus be condoned. If the above is
true, then we should ﬁnd that the norm is stronger, the more competitive the society is; and the
same should hold for all customs condemning anti-social behaviour. There is in fact evidence
(Triandis, 1989; Smith and Bond, 1993; Bond and Smith, 1996) that people from competitive
societies like that of the US conform to customs dictating behaviour in matters of relevance
for the society at large, whereas people from more cohesive societies like that of Japan tend to
comply mostly with norms prevailing in their own narrowly deﬁned reference group (be that
their family or the ﬁrm in which they work).
Since both redistribution and social mobility are important especially for the low-income
group, they will be the main supporters of a social norm against an anti-social attitude like
tax dodging. Much of the strength of the norm will thus depend on whether public opinion
is entirely dominated by the high-income classes or whether the middle-to-low-income people
carry some weight in shaping the view of the society. This will in turn depend on the solidity
of the democratic institutions in the country, e.g. the balance of power between the executive,
legislative and judiciary branches of the administration, the independence of the press and
other media, etc. In long-established and well-working democracies like the US, the UK or the
Scandinavian countries there seem indeed to be more stigma associated with tax dodging than
in institutionally more fragile nations like, say, Greece or Italy4 — not to mention transition or
3There is also a branch of social psychology that investigates the power of the minorities in aﬀecting group
behaviour, see e.g. Moscovici (1976) and Alvaro and Crano (1997).
4This can be generalised to other aspects of the social structure, like moral accountability of those in power.
The recent (summer-fall 2005) Italian central bank scandal is a good example: despite having blatantly violated
3developing countries.
The model we employ to investigate the questions posed above is a simple one. Our agents
have ﬁxed incomes and must only decide whether to dodge the income tax and if so, to what
extent. In fact, adding a variable labour supply would not be diﬃcult in principle, although
it would make the analysis more involved. The only relevant, but by no means dissonant,
modiﬁcation would be that of extending the scope of the custom, which should include a work
ethic, thus stigmatising in general anti-social attitudes; being idle, cheating on one’s taxes, etc.
To analyse the role of social competition, we assume that preferences incorporate the so-called
"relative utility" or "income comparison eﬀect" (see e.g. Easterlin 2001 for a recent discussion),
that is that agents not only care for their own consumption but also for the "distance" between
their consumption and that of a reference group. This is an immediate but eﬀective way of
capturing the presence of a status-seeking impulse behind the economic decisions of the agent.
Given the agents’ choices, we then study their policy preferences and the ensuing political
equilibrium in a standard majority voting setting. The winning policy turns out to be the one
preferred by the median voter; therefore, there will be a progressive income tax in place at the
political equilibrium, and some tax dodging will occur. In line with similar results from the
optimal taxation literature, we ﬁnd that the comparison income eﬀect calls for a high degree
of progressivity of the income tax. Additionally, we detect a similar role for the social custom;
the progressivity of the tax system is directly related to the strength of the social norm. This is
plausible, and consistent with casual observation. For example, a recent reform of the income
tax has involved a cut of marginal rates in Italy, beginning from 2005. The necessity of such
a reform had been often announced in terms that clearly signal the lack of stigma for non-
compliance: the Prime Minister has in fact endorsed avoidance as "good" behaviour, declaring
that "[i]f reasonable taxes are demanded, no one thinks about avoiding paying them. But if you
ask 50% or more ... I consider myself morally justiﬁed to do everything I can to avoid paying
them"5.
Finally, we examine what the preferences of the agents concerning the force of the social
norm are. It turns out that the strength of the norm against tax dodging can be directly
all the rules of a fair competition in a (failed) attempt at preventing a foreign bank from acquiring a controlling
position in an Italian bank, the governor did not feel compelled to quit after his behaviour was exposed to the
general public because he had not, technically, broken any law (for a journalistic account, see e.g. Gumbel, 2005).
5Reported by Time,M a r c h1, 2004, p. 17, emphasis added.
4related to the strength of the income comparison eﬀect, which is consistent with the evidence
cited above as it contributes to explain intercountry diﬀerences in the relevance of the social
custom (the US is a much more competitive and mobile society than, say, Italy, and the norm
should therefore be more binding).
Finally, note that the above succession of steps in the analysis corresponds to a standard
backward solution procedure for a model whose timing is as follows: 1) agents establish social
norms; 2) agents vote on policy; 3) agents make avoidance decisions.
II A tax avoidance model
Consider an economy inhabited by agents diﬀering for their gross incomes y. Gross income is
ﬁxed, and distributed continuously along an interval (y−,y+); the total number of agents is
normalised to unity,
R
yf (y)dy =1 . The government levies a linear income tax on the agents’
incomes, with a marginal tax rate t ≥ 0 and a uniform grant T ≥ 0. The agents have the option
to hide a share of their income from the ﬁsc by exploiting loopholes in the tax code; let a ∈ [0,1)
be the percentage of hidden income, such that r =( 1− a)y is the income actually reported,
and h = ay is hidden income. In order to avoid taxes, the agent incurs in some monetary
costs (e.g. by paying a lawyer fee to learn how to circumvent the rules) and in some psychic
costs associated with breaking the social norm sanctioning tax avoidance (provided such norm
exists).6 The m-cost function is written K (h,y), and the p-cost function is written θC (h,y),
where θ ∈ [0,1] measures the strength of the social norm (for θ =0the norm is in fact absent).
We assume that
Kh > 0,K hh > 0,C h > 0,C hh > 0; (1)
K (0,y)=Kh (0,Y)=C (0,y)=Ch (0,Y)=0 , (2)
6We model tax dodging as tax avoidance, i.e. a riskless but costly activity, as opposed to tax evasion,w h i c h
is instead risky because of the possibility of pecuniary sanctions if discovered (see e.g. Cowelll 1990b for a
discussion). In fact, the two approaches can be connected using the concept of "cost of evasion", i.e. "the
monetary amount that [a] person would just be prepared to pay in order to be guaranteed that he will get away
with tax evasion" (Cowell 1990a p. 232), and reinterpreting the cost-of-avoidance function as a reduced form of
the cost-of-evasion function. While this does not mean that the two approaches are completely equivalent, it does
normally imply that the main insights survive as we shift across them (Balestrino and Galmarini, 2003, discuss
the point at some length and provide an example).
5and that both K (·) and C (·) are homogeneous of degree one in h and y. Then, we can write
per-unit-of-true-income cost functions as
k(a) ≡ K (ay,y)/y = K (a,1); c(a) ≡ C (ay,y)/y = C (a,1), (3)
a n do fc o u r s ew ew i l lh a v et h a tb o t hk(·) and c(·) a r es t r i c t l yc o n v e xa n dt h a t
k(0) = k0 (0) = c(0) = c0 (0) = 0. (4)
The functions deﬁned in (3) are independent of true income, which makes the model much
simpler to analyse and interpret — similar assumptions are used e.g. in Boadway et al. (1994)
and Balestrino and Galmarini (2003). Further, we assume that θ depends on the beliefs that
the agents have on whether tax avoidance should be sanctioned or not, that is on how strongly
they feel that the social custom should be in place; we take it that each type has a preference on
the strength of the norm, call it θ(y), and that the actual strength of the social norm is some
function of these preferences. For concreteness, we take it to be a weighted average, where the




where m(y) ∈ (0,1),
R
m(y)dy =1are the weights. This is a simple way of capturing the
endogenous formation of rules and to emphasise the role of the majority in establishing them
(see our Introduction).
From the above, we can write the agent’s net income or consumption as
X =( 1− t + ta − k(a))y + T. (6)
The agent’s utility depends however not only on her own consumption, but also on her relative
position in the society; she is happier whenever her consumption or net income increases, and
less happy when the consumption or net income of the reference group increases. To capture
this eﬀect in a simple way, we assume that the arguments in the agent’s utility function include
her consumption as well as the diﬀerence between such consumption and the reference standard.
Hence, in general such utility function will be written
u = U (X,X − S,C), (7)
where S is the reference standard, and where utility is increasing in the ﬁrst two arguments and
decreasing in the third. For reasons of tractability, we will however use a more speciﬁcu t i l i t y
6function. Speciﬁcally, we postulate that the comparison income eﬀect enters additively, and
choose a quasi-linear utility function. More precisely, we let
x =( 1− β)X + β (X − S)=X − βS (8)
where β is a dummy variable taking values
0 for X ≥ S; e β ∈ (0,1) for X<S . (9)
This means that only agents with consumption below the standard perceive the comparison
income eﬀect; there is in fact some evidence (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005) that such eﬀect is asym-
metric and is experienced mostly by those who do not achieve the reference level, rather than
those who are above it. To keep things simple, we make the extreme assumption that "down-
ward" comparisons do not matter at all.7
Then, deﬁne utility as
u = x(a) − yθc(a). (10)
Substituting the budget into the utility function and rearranging gives:
u =( 1− t + ta − k(a) − θc(a))y + T − βS. (11)
Maximising w.r.t. a.w eg e t
t = k0 + θc0, (12)
which is necessary and suﬃcient for a maximum thanks to the strict convexity of the cost
functions. The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) has the obvious interpretation that, at the optimum,
the percentage of hidden income a equates the marginal beneﬁt (avoided taxation) with the
marginal cost (monetary plus psychic). Note that for t =0the FOC is satisﬁed at a =0 ,a si t
becomes 0=0by (4).
We denote the solution as
a = a(t,θ). (13)
7In the social psychology jargon, upward and downward comparisons are sometimes referred to as "self-
improvement" and "self-enhancement", respectively (Wood and Taylor 1991). Our assumption is then equivalent
to saying that self-improvement motives (which suggest an eﬀort to improve one’s status) dominate over self-
enhancement motives (which instead suggest some complacency in that the agent looks at those who do worse
just to feel better). Falk and Knell (2004) provide an economic analysis that includes both types of comparisons
and takes the important step of endogenising the reference standard (letting the agents "choose the Joneses").
7Given quasi-linearity, and ﬁrst-degree homogeneity of the cost functions, neither gross income
nor the reference standard aﬀect the solution.8 Straightforward comparative statics analysis
yields:
at > 0; aθ < 0, (14)
that is, the avoidance activity increases when the tax rate rises and decreases when its sanc-
tionability increases.9 We also make the following assumption on the behaviour of second
derivatives:
Assumption 1 a) att ≥ 0; b) atθ ≤ 0.
This assumption is satisﬁed by e.g. a quadratic cost function for both monetary and psychic
costs; in general it requires a restriction on the sign of the third derivatives of the cost functions.
It has a plausible interpretation: part a) says that the fraction of hidden income increases with
the tax rate at a non-decreasing pace, whereas part b) says that whenever the social norm
becomes more stringent, the fraction of hidden income becomes less (or at least not more)
reactive to increases in the tax rate.
As for reported income, r(·)=y(1 − a(·)),i ti se a s yt os e eu s i n g( 14) that r decreases as t
increases, and increases with θ,s i n c erz = −yaz,z= t,θ. Moreover, we have ry =( 1− a) > 0,
that is, reported income rises with true income. However, hidden income h = ay, also rises with
income (hy = a>0). This is consistent with the observation that tax avoidance is normally an
activity at which high-income agents are more successful (see e.g. Slemrod 2001).10
Finally, consider net income or consumption. Deﬁne
π (t,θ) ≡ 1 − t(1 − a(t,θ)) − k(a(t,θ)) > 0 (15)
as the complement to unity of the eﬀective tax rate, the percentage of income which is actually
lost due to taxation, including the beneﬁts and costs of avoidance.11 We can then write X (·)=
8Quasi-linearity also implies that neither the poll-tax nor the parameter β have any impact on the avoidance
decision.
9Details on the comparative statics are given in the Appendix.
10This is not necessarily true for all forms of imperfect compliance. Black markets activities appear to be
mostly carried out by low-income agents; see e.g. Lemieaux et al. (1994) and Anderberg et al. (2003).
11It is possible to show that (12) implies 1 >t (1 − a)+k + θc ≥ t(1 − a)+k,s ot h a tπ is indeed positive.
To see this consider the −(k
0 + θc
0) ≡− γ curve, which is decreasing in the [0,1]i n t e r v a l .T h eo p t i m a la is given
by the intersection between that curve and a straight line representing the value of t.T h e nt(1 − a)+k + θc ≡




aθ < 0; (16)




where the sign of the ﬁrst derivative follows from (12) and (14). The eﬀect w.r.t. t is ambiguous
since when the marginal tax rate is positive and rises, the eﬀective tax rate rises too because
taxation is more stringent but at the same time falls because the percentage of hidden income
increases. Hence, we have
Xθ = yπθ < 0; Xt = yπt; XT =1 ;Xy = π>0. (18)
That is, consumption rises with income and is positively aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h ep o l l -
subsidy, but falls when the norm sanctioning tax avoidance becomes more stringent; changes in
the tax rate have an ambiguous eﬀect.
An important consequence of a(·) being independent from income is that the agent’s po-
sitions on the true income distribution carry over to both the reported and net income distri-
butions; most notably the agents with, respectively, mean and median true income also have
mean and median reported and net income. We shall use frequently this fact in what follows,
as it facilitates the interpretation of the policy results.
III Preferences over policy and the political equilibrium
For simplicity, and in line with most of the literature, we shall assume that the reference standard
is given by the mean consumption level,
S = X (t,T;θ)=π(t,θ)y + T, (19)
where the upper bar denotes an average value and where the second equality sign follows because
all agents have the same a(·) and hence the same π(·). Note, from (18), that
Xt = πty; XT =1 ;Xθ = πθy<0. (20)
We are now ready to start with the policy analysis. We assume a simple Downsian model of
political competition where the candidates are solely oﬃce-motivated and commit to policies






0 tdz,s i n c e−γ (z) <tfor z ∈ (a,1) by (12). Clearly, if t(1 − a)+k + θc < t then
t(1 − a)+k + θc < 1 for t ≤ 1.
9To begin with, let us investigate the agents’ policy preferences. Indirect utility will be
written:
V (t,T;θ,y)=( 1− t + ta − k(a) − θc(a))y + T − βX (·). (21)





(a − 1)(y − βy) − βyatθc0
1 − β
, (22)







This observation is important because monotonicity of the MRS guarantees that the indiﬀerence
curves in the policy space satisfy a so-called "single-crossing" condition, which in turn ensures
that a median-voter equilibrium exists under majority voting (see Gans and Smart 1996 for
details). In fact, the single-crossing condition implies that, for any two tax rates t0 and t00 such
that t0 >t 00 and any two agents y0 and y00 such that y00 >y 0,i fy0 prefers t00 to t0,t h e na l s oy00
prefers t00 to t0; in words, agents "on the same side" of the income distribution have consistent
policy preferences.
The government’s budget constraint, written in per capita terms, is simply
tr(t,θ)=T, (24)
where we used the fact that the total size of the population is normalised to unity. Note that,
s i n c ea l la g e n t sh i d et h es a m ef r a c t i o na of their income, we have that
r(t,θ)=( 1− a(t,θ))y. (25)
We can interpret the budget equation as expressing T as a function of t (and θ)a n dc h e c k
whether the revenue curve in the (t,T)-space (holding θ ﬁxed) is strictly concave, i.e. if Tt > 0
and Ttt < 0.12 We note that Tt = r + trt,w h e r ert = −yat < 0 by (14); this is positive as long




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ < 1 (26)
i.e. if the elasticity of reported income w.r.t. the tax rate is less then unity (which is empirically
plausible, see e.g. Kopczuk 2005). The second derivative is Ttt =2 rt + trtt,a n di sn e g a t i v e
12Incidentally, notice that Tθ = trθ > 0, i.e. if the social norm becomes more stringent, revenue will go up.
10since rtt = −yatt ≤ 0 by Assumption 1. Strict concavity of the revenue curve is thus generally
guaranteed.
Consider now the ideal tax rate. It can be identiﬁed by solving Vt =0for t after substituting
T with the revenue constraint T (t,θ):
Vt =( a − 1)(y − βy) − βyatθc0 +( 1− a)y − tyat =0 . (27)
Recalling that for agents with income above the mean we have β =0(because those are also





















, for y ≥ y. (29)
Since at > 0 by (14), it follows that agents with higher than average income would prefer in-
come subsidisation, but since we ruled out this possibility they will settle for a corner solution,
t =0 . The agent with exactly average income would prefer no policy. This is also the utilitar-
ian optimum, i.e. the policy that maximises the sum (here equivalent to the mean) of utilities:
clearly, the absence of policy is the most eﬃcient solution, since it eliminates the social waste
of resources associated with avoidance. However, if an agent desires to achieve some redistri-
bution in her favour, she will willingly trade oﬀ some eﬃciency against the desired amount of
redistribution; all agents with less than average income prefer a positive rate of income tax,
no matter whether this generates tax dodging (an eﬃciency loss). Close inspection of (28) will
readily reveal that the ideal tax rate is monotonically decreasing in income for y<y (see the
Appendix for details). This is actually a straightforward variant of a well-known result from
the literature on the political economy of income taxation (see e.g. Meltzer and Richards 1981),
although we replaced the usual distortion due to a variable labour supply with the waste of
resources devoted to tax dodging.
Given our assumptions on the political competition, recalling that the median-voter theorem
applies, and adding the usual assumption that the median income is below the mean income
(which is true for virtually all real-world income distributions), we can conclude that at the
political equilibrium there will be a positive tax rate, and that a certain amount of tax avoidance
activity will thus be carried out. Letting ym denote median income, and ignoring the term e βθc0












The budget-balancing value of the universal grant will be established via the relationship
T (t(ym,θ,β),θ).
It is interesting to note that the ideal policy problem for agents with below-mean income
(including in particular the median income agent) is well-behaved in the sense that Vtt < 0;t h i s
allows us to perform a meaningful comparative statics analysis to check the impact of changes










The ﬁrst result parallels similar results obtained in the optimal taxation literature (see e.g.
Boskin and Sheshinski 1978 and Ireland 2001), where it has been found that the comparison
income eﬀect calls for a high degree of progressivity of the income tax, and more generally, that
it justiﬁes, from a normative standpoint, the existence of a redistributive tax system. Here, we
argue that also from a positive standpoint the comparison income eﬀect has an important role
to play; it helps to explain why redistributive tax systems are eﬀectively in place in virtually all
the developed countries. The reason is obvious: each voter whose income is below the mean, in
particular here the decisive one, views a positive rate of income tax as a means to achieve some
redistribution in her own favour as well as a means to reduce the net income of the reference
individual; thus, income taxation works from both ends, by boosting one’s consumption and by
decreasing the reference consumption.
The second result is speciﬁc to our contribution, and oﬀers a complementary explanation of
the prevalence of redistributive tax systems; it says that the stronger is the social norm against
tax avoidance, the higher will be the tax rate at the political equilibrium. The straightforward
reason is that when tax dodging carries social stigma, redistribution can be pushed farther
because it entails a lower eﬃciency loss (it generates less avoidance activity).
So far, we discussed the impact of the income comparison eﬀect and of the social custom on
the "statutory", as opposed to "eﬀective", rate of income tax. However, an increase in the tax
rate as determined by the law does not necessarily bring about an increase of the actual tax
13Indeed,  β, θ and c
0 are all less than unity.
14Details of the analysis are given in the Appendix.
12rate faced by the agent. The latter, as we already know from (15), is
τ (t,θ)=t(1 − a(t,θ)) + k(a(t,θ)) (32)




















= −πttθ − πθ. (33)
We can however argue the following. If we evaluate the above derivatives at θ =0 ,w eﬁnd that
since πt|θ=0 = a − 1 < 0 and πθ|θ=0 =0 ,15 then dτ/dβ > 0 and dτ/dθ > 0 by (31). When the
norm against tax dodging begins to take shape, then a stronger comparison income eﬀect and
a stronger social custom both imply a larger statutory tax rate as well as a larger eﬀective tax
rate. However, this marginal result does not necessarily generalise to a global result.
IV Endogenous formation of the social norm
I nt h ea n a l y s i ss of a r ,w eh a v et r e a t e dβ and θ as exogenous, and independent from each other.
However, we shall argue presently that the strength of the social custom condemning tax dodging
depends also on the comparison income eﬀect. To see this, we turn to the analysis of the origin
of the social norm. Just like agents have preferences over policy, they have preferences over
the extent to which tax avoidance should be socially condemned; do they feel that tax dodgers
must be sent to jail, or rather think that their activities are justiﬁable after all? It turns out
that in the present framework, there are two reasons why it is collectively rational to impose a
social norm against tax dodging.
Let us move a further step backward and consider how indirect utility is aﬀected by changes
in the parameter θ (expressing the force of the social norm) when the equilibrium policy is in
place. Let us then write
W (θ,y)=( 1− tm + tma(tm) − k(a(tm)) − θc(a(tm)))y + T (tm,θ) − βX (tm,θ) (34)
where tm = t(ym,β,θ) and a is chosen optimally given t = tm.
We can now ask what the preferred θ would be for each agent. If we maximise W (·) w.r.t.
θ, under the constraint that θ ≥ 0,16 we have that
Wθ = Vtmtm
θ − βXθ − yc ≤ 0; θ ≥ 0; θVθ =0 . (35)
15This is because t = k
0 when θ =0by (12).
16We assume that the constraint θ ≤ 1 is always satisﬁed.
13level of y Marg. beneﬁt Marg. cost value of θ
y<y m Vtmtm
θ − βXθ = yc θ>0
y = ym −βXθ = yc θ>0
y ∈ (ym,y) −βXθ = yc− Vtmtm
θ θ>0
y ≥ y 0 > yc− Vtmtm
θ θ =0
Table 1: The pattern of preferred strength of the social norm
where Vtm = Vt|t=tm and V (·) is deﬁned by (21).
Consider ﬁrst agents with income below the mean.F o rt h e m ,w eh a v ea ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n ,
i.e.:
Vtmtm
θ − βXθ = yc, (36)
which can be interpreted as net marginal beneﬁt( Vtmtm
θ −βXθ) equating marginal cost (yc).17
The marginal cost of θ is simply the total disutility of violating the norm. The marginal beneﬁt
is instead more complicated, as it includes the impact on the equilibrium tax rate as well as
that on the reference standard. We know that an increase in θ produces a higher equilibrium
tax rate, as tm
θ > 0 by (31); hence, a marginally higher θ will represent a gain for all agents
will income below the median, who would prefer a higher tax rate than the equilibrium one
(for them Vtm > 0), and a loss for all agents with income above the median (Vtm < 0), while
agents with median income will be unaﬀected (Vtm =0 ). As far as the reference standard is
concerned, all agents below the mean income beneﬁt from a marginal increase in θ, since it will
reduce average consumption, Xθ < 0 by (20).
For agents with income equal or above the mean, we have instead a corner solution, since
for them Vtm < 0 and β =0 ,s ot h a tWt = Vtmtm
θ − yc < 0, and therefore θ(y)=0 ;for the
high-income agents the social norm does not generate any beneﬁt, only costs.
The condition (36) takes thus diﬀerent forms depending on the level of the agent’s income;
table 1 summarizes. The comparative statics does not yield unambiguous results; however,
considering the various conditions in turn, there is a presumption that, as income increases, the
individually preferred strength of the social norm should tendentially decrease; beneﬁts appear
to rise, and costs to fall, with income. Moreover, it is also to be expected that the individually
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< 0 and larger (in absolute value) than −yaθc
0 > 0.
14optimal θ will rise with β,a sal a r g e rβ appears to entail a larger beneﬁtf r o mθ; as we mentioned
above, a custom against a form of anti-social behaviour like dodging taxes is particularly felt
when there is a strong social competition.
The actual value of θ will be determined by (5); crucially, we see that in general it will be
positive, since the majority of the agents have a preference for condemning tax dodging. In a
sense, it is the desire for redistribution that motivates the presence of a social stigma attached
to avoidance: if at the political equilibrium prevails a positive rate of income tax, then it will
also prevail in the society a view of avoidance as socially inacceptable. But is is also true that
whenever such a view is established, there will be a tendency for the tax system to be more
progressive, at least in statutory terms (we have already seen that it is uncertain whether higher
legal tax rates correspond to higher eﬀe c t i v et a xr a t e s—s e et h ed i s c u s s i o na tt h ee n do ft h e
previous section). This is because stigmatizing tax dodgers makes redistribution more eﬀective
and because it makes easier to achieve the reference standard. Thus, the intensity of the income
comparison eﬀect is key for determining how relevant will be the norm. The strength of the
norm will however depend also on the shape of the income distribution and, importantly, on
the weights; in particular, if these are positively correlated with income, the social norm will
have less impact than otherwise.
V Concluding remarks
We have modelled the behaviour of taxpayers trying to decide the amount of income they can
hide from the ﬁscal authorities, assumin\g that their choices are aﬀected, among other things,
by the presence of a social norm stigmatizing tax dodging. After identifying the taxpayers’ equi-
librium, we have evaluated their political preferences, and found that the political equilibrium
is of the median voter variety. Finally, we have investigated the source of the social custom,
and discussed its impact on the policy prevailing at the political equilibrium. In particular,
we argued that this norm makes the tax system more likely to be statutorily progressive; the
question whether this results also in the tax system being more eﬀectively progressive remains
unresolved.
We found that the strength of the social norm depends on two factors. First, such a norm
plays a useful social role because it makes redistribution more eﬀective; second, it facilitates
social competition. As such, it is valued mostly by the low-income individuals, who have much
to beneﬁt both from redistribution and social mobility. Hence, it will be particularly felt in
15societies with stable democratic institutions in which even the poor can make their voice heard
by the general public. This is consistent with the observation that in mature democracies like
those of the Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian countries there is much more stigma associated with
anti-social acts like tax dodging than in less stable democracies, like those of some Southern
European countries or those of the transition and developing countries.
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Appendix
As mentioned in the main text, this appendix illustrates the details of the comparative statics,
both for the agent’s and the political equilibrium.
Comparative statics of the agent’s equilibrium
At an interior solution we know that
ua = t − k0y − θc0 =0 ;uaa = −k00 − θc00 < 0 (A1)
It is then immediate to compute:









as reported in (14).
Comparative statics of the political equilibrium
The ideal tax rate, for all agents below the average income, is found by solving
Vt =( a − 1)(y − βy)+( 1− a)y − tyat − βyatθc0 =0 (A4)
for t. In order to simplify the derivation of the comparative statics results it is important to
recognise that the last term in (A4) is in fact negligible since βθc0 ' 0.T h e n
Vtt = at (y − (1 + β)y) − tyatt < 0; (A5)
18the sign follows because att ≥ 0 by Assumption 1. Then, we have
Vty = a − 1 < 0; (A6)
Vtβ = −y(a − 1) = r>0; (A7)
Vtθ = aθ(y − (1 + β)y) − tyatθ > 0; (A8)




< 0; tβ = −
Vtβ
Vtt




T h es i g no ft h eﬁrst derivative tells us that the ideal tax rate is decreasing in income, as explained
informally in the main text. The signs of the second and third derivatives, when applied to the
winning policy, the median voter’s preferred tax rate, conﬁrm (31).
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